12 pages, 3 figures; contribution to the special issue "Viewing the World through Spin Glasses" in honour of David Sherrington on the occasion of his 65th birthday
The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes and is linked to the specifics of the agents' learning rules. Here we study how the standard scenario is affected in a mixed population game in which agents with the `optimal' learning rule (i.e. the one leading to efficiency) coexist with ones whose adaptive dynamics is sub-optimal. Our generic finding is that any non-vanishing intensive fraction of optimal agents guarantees the existence of an efficient phase. Specifically, we calculate the dependence of the critical point on the fraction $q$ of `optimal' agents focusing our analysis on three cases: MGs with market impact correction, grand-canonical MGs and MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels.
A brief review is given of the minority game, an idealized model stimulated by a market of speculative agents, and its complex many-body behaviour. Particular consideration is given to analytic results for the model rather than discussions of its relevance in real-world situations.
This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the …
We present a simple introduction to the basic Minority Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang in 1997 and discuss some of its physical properties and subsequent developments. We also introduce some of its variants include the Evolutionay Minority Game (EMG), the Thermal Minority Game (TMG), the simple Minority Game without information and the Grand-canonical Minority Game (GCMG). Some analytical approaches on Minority Games and the relations of Minority Games with financial market are also briefly discussed.
We introduce the minority game theory for two kinds of the Korean treasury bond (KTB) in Korean futures exchange markets. Since we discuss numerically the standard deviation and the global efficiency for an arbitrary strategy, our case is found to be approximate to the majority game. Our result presented will be compared with numerical findings for the well-known minority and majority game models.
Minority games where groups of agents remember, react or incorporate information with different timescales are investigated. We study how their respective gains depend on their timescales for standard models and games with no public information, and support our findings by analytical arguments whenever possible.
We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information available in that market. More specifically, in the canonical game players play preferentially in the stock with less information. The same holds in the grand canonical game when agents have positive incentives to trade, whereas when agents payoff are solely related to their speculative ability they display a l…
In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system information to players when more than two alternatives are available. Thus, it is instructive to study the dynamics and cooperative behaviors of this extended game as a function of the global information provided. We numerically find that although the system dynamics depends on the kind of public information given to the players, the degree of cooperation follow…
We study the structure of the underlying network of connections in the Minority Game. There is not an explicit interaction among the agents, but they interact via global magnitudes of the model and mainly through their strategies. We define a link between two agents by quantifying the similarity among their strategies, and analyze the structure of the resulting underlying complex networks as a function of the number of agents in the game and the value of the agents' memory, in games with two strategies per player. We characterize the different phases of this system with networks with different…
Ergodic stationary states of Minority Games with S strategies per agent can be characterised in terms of the asymptotic probabilities $ϕ_a$ with which an agent uses $a$ of his strategies. We propose here a simple and general method to calculate these quantities in batch canonical and grand-canonical models. Known analytic theories are easily recovered as limiting cases and, as a further application, the strategy frequency problem for the batch grand-canonical Minority Game with S=2 is solved. The generalization of these ideas to multi-asset models is also presented. Though similarly based on r…
Minority game is a simple-mined econophysical model capturing the cooperative behavior among selfish players. Previous investigations, which were based on numerical simulations up to about 100 players for a certain parameter $α$ in the range $0.1 \lesssim α\lesssim 1$, suggested that memory is irrelevant to the cooperative behavior of the minority game in the so-called symmetric phase. Here using a large scale numerical simulation up to about 3000 players in the parameter range $0.01 \lesssim α\lesssim 1$, we show that the mean variance of the attendance in the minority game actually depends o…
The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players' main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of several well-known learning processes in the minority game with an arbitrary odd number of players. Interestingly, different learning processes provide considerably different predictions.
We discuss a simple version of the Minority Game (MG) in which agents hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly. This feature is known to be crucial for MGs to reproduce stylised facts of real market data. The stationary states and phase diagram of the model can be computed, and we show that the ergodicity breaking phase transition common for MGs, and marked by a divergence of the integrated response is present also in this simplified model. An analogous majority game t…
We review the recent approaches to modelling financial markets based on multi-agent systems. After a brief summary of the basic stylised facts observed in real-market time-series we discuss some simple agent-based systems which are currently used to model financial markets. One of the most prominent examples is here the Minority Game (MG), which we address in some more detail. After a brief discussion of its basic setup and general phenomenology we summarise the main findings of the statistical mechanics analysis and discuss the emergence of stylised facts in extensions of the MG near their ph…
A new simple model of financial market is proposed, based on the sequential and inter-temporal nature of trader-trader interaction, and on a new simple trading strategy space. In this pattern-based speculation model, the traders open and close their positions explicitly. Information ecology is strikingly similar to that of the Minority Game which suggest to reinterpret the latter as a model of synchronisation of predictability exploitation. Naive and sophisticated agents are shown to give rise to very different phenomenology
In this paper it was developed a modification of the known multiagent model Minority Game, designed to simulate the behavior of traders in financial markets and the resulting price dynamics on the abstract resource. The model was implemented in the form of software. The modified version of Minority Game was investigated with the aim of reproducing the basic properties of real financial time series. It was proved that such properties as the clustering of volatility, the Levy distribution and multifractality are inherent for generated by this version of the Minority Game time series of prices.
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the fluctuation occured first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime there always exists a history of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.
We present a spherical version of the grand-canonical minority game (GCMG), and solve its dynamics in the stationary state. The model displays several types of transitions between multiple ergodic phases and one non-ergodic phase. We derive analytical solutions, including exact expressions for the volatility, throughout all ergodic phases, and compute the phase behaviour of the system. In contrast to conventional GCMGs, where the introduction of memory-loss precludes analytical approaches, the spherical model can be solved also when exponential discounting is taken into account. For the case o…
Price dynamics is analyzed in terms of a model which includes the possibility of effective forces due to trend followers or trend adverse strategies. The method is tested on the data of a minority-majority model and indeed it is capable of reconstructing the prevailing traders' strategies in a given time interval. Then we also analyze real (NYSE) stock-prices dynamics and it is possible to derive an indication for the the ``sentiment'' of the market for time intervals of at least one day.
We solve the dynamics of large spherical Minority Games (MG) in the presence of non-negligible time dependent external contributions to the overall market bid. The latter represent the actions of market regulators, or other major natural or political events that impact on the market. In contrast to non-spherical MGs, the spherical formulation allows one to derive closed dynamical order parameter equations in explicit form and work out the market's response to such events fully analytically. We focus on a comparison between the response to stationary versus oscillating market interventions, and…
Hypothesis Testing Minority Game (HMG) is a variant of the standard Minority Game (MG) that models the inertial behavior of agents in the market. In the earlier study of our group, we find that agents cooperate better in HMG than in the standard MG when strategies are picked from the full strategy space. Here we continue to study the behavior of HMG when strategies are chosen from the maximal reduced strategy space. Surprisingly, we find that, unlike the standard MG, the level of cooperation in HMG depends strongly on the strategy space used. In addition, a novel intermittency dynamics is also…
The search for more realistic modeling of financial time series reveals several stylized facts of real markets. In this work we focus on the multifractal properties found in price and index signals. Although the usual Minority Game (MG) models do not exhibit multifractality, we study here one of its variants that does. We show that the nonsynchronous MG models in the nonergodic phase is multifractal and in this sense, together with other stylized facts, constitute a better modeling tool. Using the Structure Function (SF) approach we detected the stationary and the scaling range of the time ser…
The unprecedented access offered by the World Wide Web brings with it the potential to gather huge amounts of data on human activities. Here we exploit this by using a toy model of financial markets, the Minority Game (MG), to investigate human speculative trading behaviour and information capacity. Hundreds of individuals have played a total of tens of thousands of game turns against computer-controlled agents in the Web-based_Interactive Minority Game_. The analytical understanding of the MG permits fine-tuning of the market situations encountered, allowing for investigation of human behavio…
In the Minority Game (MG), an odd number of heterogeneous and adaptive agents choose between two alternatives and those who end up on the minority side win. When the information available to the agents to make their choice is the identity of the minority side for the past $m$ days, it is well-known that emergent coordination among the agents is maximum when $m \sim \log_2(N)$. The optimal memory-length thus increases with the system size. In this work, we show that, in MG when the information available to the agents to make their choice is the strength of the minority side for the past $m$ day…
Perfect synchronicity in $N$-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets are asynchronous by design, and yet most theoretical models assume perfectly synchronized actions. We propose a general method to transform standard models of adaptive agents into asynchronous systems while preserving their global structure under some conditions. Using the Minority Game as an example, we find that the phase and fluctuations structure of the standard game subsists even in maximally as…
We study the equilibrium distribution of relative strategy scores of agents in the asymmetric phase ($α\equiv P/N\gtrsim 1$) of the basic Minority Game using sign-payoff, with $N$ agents holding two strategies over $P$ histories. We formulate a statistical model that makes use of the gauge freedom with respect to the ordering of an agent's strategies to quantify the correlation between the attendance and the distribution of strategies. The relative score $x\in\mathbb{Z}$ of the two strategies of an agent is described in terms of a one dimensional random walk with asymmetric jump probabilities,…
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point i…
Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is our track record in these areas? There is little understanding of when and under what circumstances we may over-estimate or even lose our ability to control and optimize outcomes, especially when they are the result of aggregations of individual optimization processes. Here, we demonstrate analytically using the theory of Markov Chains and by numerical simu…
The Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG) is an instance of the Minority Game (MG) which includes a single copy of every potential agent. In this work, we explicitly solve the FSMG thanks to certain symmetries of this game. Furthermore, by considering the MG as a statistical sample of the FSMG, we compute approximated values of the key variable σ2/N in the symmetric phase for different versions of the MG. As another application we prove that our results can be easily modified in order to handle certain kind of initial biased strategies scores, in particular when the bias is introduced at the agen…
We show that in a variant of the Minority Game problem, the agents can reach a state of maximum social efficiency, where the fluctuation between the two choices is minimum, by following a simple stochastic strategy. By imagining a social scenario where the agents can only guess about the number of excess people in the majority, we show that as long as the guess value is sufficiently close to the reality, the system can reach a state of full efficiency or minimum fluctuation. A continuous transition to less efficient condition is observed when the guess value becomes worse. Hence, people can op…
We use generating functional methods to solve the so-called inner product versions of the minority game (MG), with fake and/or real market histories, by generalizing the theory developed recently for look-up table MGs with real histories. The phase diagrams of the lookup table and inner product MG versions are generally found to be identical, with the exception of inner product MGs where histories are sampled linearly, which are found to be structurally critical. However, we encounter interesting differences both in the theory (where the role of the history frequency distribution in lookup tab…
In mix-game which is an extension of minority game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. This paper studies the change of the average winnings of agents and volatilities vs. the change of mixture of agents in mix-game model. It finds that the correlations between the average winnings of agents and the mean of local volatilities are different with different combinations of agent memory length when the proportion of agents in group 1 increases. This study result suggests that memory length of agents in group1 be smaller than that…
Resource allocation systems provide the fundamental support for the normal functioning and well being of the modern society, and can be modeled as minority games. A ubiquitous dynamical phenomenon is the emergence of herding, where a vast majority of the users concentrate on a small number of resources, leading to a low efficiency in resource allocation. To devise strategies to prevent herding is thus of high interest. Previous works focused on control strategies that rely on external interventions, such as pinning control where a fraction of users are forced to choose a certain action. Is it …
Complex adaptive systems have been the subject of much recent attention. It is by now well-established that members (`agents') tend to self-segregate into opposing groups characterized by extreme behavior. However, while different social and biological systems manifest different payoffs, the study of such adaptive systems has mostly been restricted to simple situations in which the prize-to-fine ratio, $R$, equals unity. In this Letter we explore the dynamics of evolving populations with various different values of the ratio $R$, and demonstrate that extreme behavior is in fact {\it not} a gen…
Active-Absorbing Phase Transitions in the Parallel Minority Game
School of Computational & Integrative Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University（贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁大学计算与整合科学学院）；Department of Physics, SRM University - AP（安得拉邦SRM大学物理系）
We introduce a version of the Minority Game where the total number of available choices is $D>2$, but the agents only have two available choices to switch. For all agents at an instant in any given choice, therefore, the other choice is distributed between the remaining $D-1$ options. This brings in the added complexity in reaching a state with the maximum resource utilization, in the sense that the game is essentially a set of MG that are coupled and played in parallel. We show that a stochastic strategy, used in the MG, works well here too. We discuss the limits in which the model reduces to…
Resource allocation takes place in various types of real-world complex systems such as urban traf- fic, social services institutions, economical and ecosystems. Mathematically, the dynamical process of complex resource allocation can be modeled as minority games in which the number of resources is limited and agents tend to choose the less used resource based on available information. Spontaneous evolution of the resource allocation dynamics, however, often leads to a harmful herding behavior accompanied by strong fluctuations in which a large majority of agents crowd temporarily for a few res…
This paper studies the correlations of the average winnings of agents and the volatilities of systems based on mix-game model which is an extension of minority game (MG). In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. The results show that the correlations between the average winnings of agents and the mean of local volatilities are different with different combinations of agents' memory lengths when the proportion of agents in group1 increases. The average winnings of agents can represent the average individual performance …
We study a competition dynamics, based on the minority game, endowed with various substrate network structures. We observe the effects of the network topologies by investigating the volatility of the system and the structure of follower networks. The topology of substrate structures significantly influences the system efficiency represented by the volatility and such substrate networks are shown to amplify the herding effect and cause inefficiency in most cases. The follower networks emerging from the leadership structure show a power-law incoming degree distribution. This study shows the emer…
this paper addresses the issue of the relation between the system efficiency and the individual performance with different combinations of agent memory lengths in mix-game model which is an extension of minority game (MG). In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. The average winnings of agents can represent the average individual performance and the volatility of a system can represent the efficiency of the system. It is found the correlations between the average winnings of agents and the medians of local volatilities…
Resource allocation takes place in various kinds of real-world complex systems, such as the traffic systems, social services institutions or organizations, or even the ecosystems. The fundamental principle underlying complex resource-allocation dynamics is Boolean interactions associated with minority games, as resources are generally limited and agents tend to choose the least used resource based on available information. A common but harmful dynamical behavior in resource-allocation systems is herding, where there are time intervals during which a large majority of the agents compete for a f…
Strategy evaluation schemes are a crucial factor in any agent-based market model, as they determine the agents' strategy preferences and consequently their behavioral pattern. This study investigates how the strategy evaluation schemes adopted by agents affect their performance in conjunction with the market circumstances. We observe the performance of three strategy evaluation schemes, the history-dependent wealth game, the trend-opposing minority game, and the trend-following majority game, in a stock market where the price is exogenously determined. The price is either directly adopted from…
This paper studies the relations between agent performances and their intellective abilities in mix-games in which there are two groups of agents: one group plays a minority game, and the other plays a majority game. These two groups have different historical memories and different time horizons. It is found that these relations are greatly influenced by the configurations of historical memories of the two groups.
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the majority, while the rest want to make the minority choice. This resembles opinion spreading with "contrarian" agents, but has the game theoretic aspect that agents try to optimize their own situation in ways that are incompatible with the common good. When this fraction is less than 1/2, the population can efficiently self-organize to a state where agents ge…
