具有不同已知历史的多重选择少数者博弈
Multiplpe Choice Minority Game With Different Publicly Known Histories
摘要：
在标准的少数者博弈中，玩家使用历史上少数者的选择作为唯一的公共信息，从两个选项中选择一个。然而，当有两个以上的选择时，公布历史少数选择并不是向玩家展示全局系统信息的唯一方法。因此，它是有益的，研究这个扩展的游戏作为一个功能的全球信息提供的动力学和合作行为。我们发现，虽然系统动力学依赖于给玩家的公共信息的种类，合作的程度遵循相同的趋势，作为标准的少数者博弈。我们还解释了我们的研究结果的人群-反人群理论。
英文摘要：
In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system information to players when more than two alternatives are available. Thus, it is instructive to study the dynamics and cooperative behaviors of this extended game as a function of the global information provided. We numerically find that although the system dynamics depends on the kind of public information given to the players, the degree of cooperation follows the same trend as that of the standard Minority Game. We also explain most of our findings by the crowd-anticrowd theory.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
