带折扣的简单少数者博弈的动态不稳定性
Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting
摘要:
我们探讨了折扣和实验的影响,在一个简单的模型相互作用的自适应代理。代理人属于两种类型中的任何一种,每个代理人都必须决定是否参加一个游戏,当另一种类型的玩家过多时,这个游戏是有利可图的。我们发现出现大的波动作为一个动态的不稳定性,可能会出现不连续(增加折扣因子)或连续(降低实验率)的发病的结果。的相图的特点是详细和噪声放大接近分岔点被确定为背后的不稳定性的物理机制。
英文摘要:
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point is identified as the physical mechanism behind the instability.
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