少数人博弈：经济学视角
The minority game: An economics perspective
摘要：
本文对少数人博弈文学进行了批判性的描述。少数人博弈是一个简单的拥挤博弈：玩家需要在两个选项中做出选择，选择了少数人选择的选项的人获胜。本文提出的学习模型似乎与经济学中常用的学习模型有明显的不同。我们将少数民族游戏文献的学习模型与标准的游戏理论学习模型联系起来，并表明实际上它与这些模型有许多共同的特点。然而，学习模型的预测与大多数其他学习模型的预测有很大不同。我们讨论了少数民族游戏文献中提出的学习模型的主要预测，并将其与拥塞游戏的实验结果进行比较。
英文摘要：
This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
