This paper proposes a modification to Minority Game (MG) by adding some agents who play majority game into MG. So it is referred to as mix-game. The highlight of this model is that the two groups of agents in mix-game have different bounded abilities to deal with history information and to count their own performance. Through simulations, this paper finds out that the local volatilities change a lot by adding some agents who play majority game into MG, and the change of local volatilities largely depends on different combinations of history memories of the two groups. Furthermore this paper analyses the underlying mechanisms for this finding. It also gives an example of applications of mix-game.
People often help others who are in trouble, especially in emergency evacuation situations. For instance, during the 2005 London bombings, it was reported that evacuees helped injured persons to escape the place of danger. In terms of game theory, it can be understood that such helping behavior provides a collective good while it is a costly behavior because the volunteers spend extra time to assist the injured persons in case of emergency evacuations. In order to study the collective effects of helping behavior in emergency evacuations, we have performed numerical simulations of helping behav…
Mean Field Games provide a powerful framework to analyze the dynamics of a large number of controlled objects in interaction. Though these models are much simpler than the underlying differential games they describe in some limit, their behavior is still far from being fully understood. When the system is confined, a notion of "ergodic state" has been introduced that characterizes most of the dynamics for long optimization times. Here we consider a class of models without such an ergodic state, and show the existence of a scaling solution that plays similar role. Its universality and scaling b…
Opposition to vaccination has long been a non-negligible public health phenomenon resulted from people's varied perceptions toward vaccination (e.g., vaccine-phobia). This paper investigates the voluntary vaccination behavior of a heterogeneous population during an epidemic outbreak, where each individual makes its own vaccination decision to minimize its expected disutility from both vaccine-phobia and the risk of infection. Such a problem is known as a vaccination game, as people's vaccination decisions not only affect their own disutilities but those of all others through probabilistic dise…
We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em indifference} w.r.t. the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the globa…
Despite many efforts, the behavior of a crowd is not fully understood. The advent of modern communication media has made it an even more challenging problem, as crowd dynamics could be driven by both human-to-human and human-technology interactions. Here, we study the dynamics of a crowd controlled game (Twitch Plays Pokémon), in which nearly a million players participated during more than two weeks. We dissect the temporal evolution of the system dynamics along the two distinct phases that characterized the game. We find that players who do not follow the crowd average behavior are key to suc…
In this work, we aim to answer the question: what triggers cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit by taking recourse to the Public goods game. Using the idea of mapping the 1D Ising model Hamiltonian with nearest neighbor coupling to payoffs in the game theory we calculate the Magnetisation of the game in the thermodynamic limit. We see a phase transition in the thermodynamic limit of the two player Public goods game. We observe that punishment acts as an external field for the two player Public goods game triggering cooperation or provide strategy, while cost can be a trigger for sup…
