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arXiv 2006.14207physics.soc-ph
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基于志愿者两难博弈的应急疏散救助行为建模

Modeling Helping Behavior in Emergency Evacuations Using Volunteer's Dilemma Game

Jaeyoung Kwak, Michael H Lees, Wentong Cai, Marcus EH Ong

摘要:

人们经常帮助有困难的人,特别是在紧急疏散的情况下。例如,据报告,在2005年伦敦爆炸事件中,疏散人员帮助受伤人员逃离危险地点。从博弈论的角度来看,这种救助行为提供了一种集体利益,但它是一种代价高昂的行为,因为在紧急疏散的情况下,志愿者会花费额外的时间来帮助受伤人员。为了研究紧急疏散中助人行为的集体效应,我们对疏散场景中疏散人员的助人行为进行了数值模拟。我们的模拟模型是基于志愿者的两难博弈反映志愿服务成本。博弈论模型与社会力量模型相结合,以了解疏散场景的空间和社会动态之间的关系。通过系统地改变帮助行为的成本参数,我们观察到了不同的集体帮助行为模式,并将这些模式概括为一个相图。

英文摘要:

People often help others who are in trouble, especially in emergency evacuation situations. For instance, during the 2005 London bombings, it was reported that evacuees helped injured persons to escape the place of danger. In terms of game theory, it can be understood that such helping behavior provides a collective good while it is a costly behavior because the volunteers spend extra time to assist the injured persons in case of emergency evacuations. In order to study the collective effects of helping behavior in emergency evacuations, we have performed numerical simulations of helping behavior among evacuees in a room evacuation scenario. Our simulation model is based on the volunteer's dilemma game reflecting volunteering cost. The game theoretic model is coupled with a social force model to understand the relationship between the spatial and social dynamics of evacuation scenarios. By systematically changing the cost parameter of helping behavior, we observed different patterns of collective helping behaviors and these collective patterns are summarized with a phase diagram.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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