博弈论中基于混合策略的迭代Logit量子响应动力学的稳定性
Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory
摘要:
采用Logit量子响应形式作为每一步的响应函数,将静态量子响应平衡(QRE)的原始定义扩展为迭代演化过程。QRE仍然是动态过程的固定点。然而,根据这些不动点是否是动态过程的长期解,它们可以分为稳定(SQRE)和不稳定(USQRE)平衡。这种扩展类似于从静态纳什均衡(NE)的进化博弈论的框架中的进化稳定的解决方案的扩展。SQRE和其他解决方案的概念,包括NEs和QREs之间的关系进行了讨论。使用其他已发表论文的实验数据,我们进行了初步的比较SQRE,NE,QRE和观察到的行为结果,这些实验。对于某些游戏,我们确定SQRE比QRE和NE具有更好的预测能力。
英文摘要:
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。