In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze the optimal design of large contests, such as university admissions and research funding. Under a broad class of distributional preferences, the optimal allocation rules are step functions with at most two steps, thus rationalizing several real-world examples. From a methodological perspective, we leverage the mathematics of extreme points to characterize optimal allocation rules in environments where the distribution of efforts can be endogenous. When the designer wants to maximize aggregate effort, the optimal allocation rule sets a performance threshold and it awards prizes at random above it, provided noise is sufficiently small. When noise is larger, awarding prizes to the best performers becomes optimal.
School of Management and Economics and Shenzhen Finance Institute, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen(香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院和深圳金融研究院);Department of Economics, National University of Singapore(新加坡国立大学经济系)
Reversing Reserve Logic: Optimal Holdback in Local Allocation under Scalable Entry
Market Design Center, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学研究市场设计中心);Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications(电气通信大学信息工学研究院)