反向储备逻辑：可扩展进入下本地分配中的最优扣留
Reversing Reserve Logic: Optimal Holdback in Local Allocation under Scalable Entry
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中文总结 AI 辅助
针对自动参与者争夺稀缺机会的问题，提出一种匿名筛选规则，通过将异常强对手视为进入者模仿证据实现最优扣留，可提高目标用户剩余并支持非进入均衡。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
演唱会门票、加速器时间等稀缺机会可能被能创建账户并维持超出承诺受限目标用户能力的自动参与者争夺。当账户数量不可信时，我们研究忽略账户数量、限制保留负担、仅使用账户的承诺和最强对手、拒绝领先者后不重新分配的匿名筛选规则。在该类别中，我们刻画了当目标用户完全承诺且可扩展进入者不进入时，最大化目标用户期望效用的规则：低拥堵时退款并分配，中等拥堵时保留并分配，最强对手处于上尾时，保留同时拒绝原本符合条件的领先者的分配。与拒绝低领先出价的传统储备不同，该规则将异常强大的对手视为进入者模仿的证据。直接对偶证书证明了类别最优性；基准显示，在无需支持非进入前，上尾扣留可提高目标用户剩余。该规则支持完全承诺和进入者不进入的均衡。
英文摘要
Scarce opportunities such as concert tickets and accelerator time may be contested by automated participants that can create accounts and sustain commitments beyond the reach of commitment-limited intended users. When account counts are untrusted, we study anonymous screening rules that ignore them, cap retained burdens, use only an account's commitment and strongest rival, and do not reassign after rejecting the leader. Within this class, we characterize the rule maximizing intended users' expected utility when they commit fully and a scalable entrant stays out. The optimum refunds and allocates at low congestion, retains and allocates at intermediate congestion, and retains while withholding allocation from an otherwise eligible leader when the strongest rival lies in the upper tail. Unlike a conventional reserve, which rejects a low leading bid, this rule treats an unusually strong rival as evidence of entrant imitation. A direct dual certificate proves class optimality; a benchmark shows that upper-tail holdback can raise intended-user surplus before it is necessary to support non-entry. The rule supports an equilibrium with full commitment and entrant non-entry.
