选择性竞赛中选拔效率与社会成本的平衡
Balancing Selection Efficiency and Societal Costs in Selective Contests
AI总结:
本文将选择性竞赛建模为二元行动的最优竞赛设计问题,刻画选拔效率与社会成本的可行集,证明二者互补,并表明关注社会成本的设计者应通过调整随机性强度参数来优化竞赛设计。
摘要:
在过度竞争的环境中,如学校招生,选择性竞赛可能损害参与者的整体福利。本文将这一情形建模为一个具有二元行动的最优竞赛设计问题,将努力成本视为为实现期望选拔水平而产生的社会成本。通过建立选拔效率和社会成本与可行均衡策略之间的关系,我们刻画了选择性竞赛中选拔效率与社会成本的可行集。我们发现选拔效率与参赛者福利是互补的,即几乎不可能在不牺牲其中一方的情况下改善另一方。我们推导出给定可行集下的最优均衡结果,并刻画了相应的最优竞赛设计。我们的分析表明,对于足够关注社会成本的竞赛设计者而言,有意在竞赛中引入随机性总是最优的。此外,我们证明设计者可以通过调整一个与随机性强度相关的单一参数来优化任意线性收益函数,而无需改变竞赛的具体结构。
英文摘要:
Selective contests can impair participants' overall welfare in overcompetitive environments, such as school admissions. This paper models the situation as an optimal contest design problem with binary actions, treating effort costs as societal costs incurred to achieve a desired level of selectivity. We provide a characterization for the feasible set of selection efficiency and societal cost in selective contests by establishing their relationship with feasible equilibrium strategies. We find that selection efficiency and contestants' welfare are complementary, i.e. it is almost impossible to improve one without sacrificing the other. We derive the optimal equilibrium outcome given the feasible set and characterize the corresponding optimal contest design. Our analysis demonstrates that it is always optimal for a contest designer who is sufficiently concerned with societal cost to intentionally introduce randomness into the contest. Furthermore, we show that the designer can optimize any linear payoff function by adjusting a single parameter related to the intensity of randomness, without altering the specific structure of the contest.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。