抽取式竞赛设计
Extractive contest design
摘要:
我们考虑竞赛成功函数(CSF),提取参赛者的奖金值。在共值情形下,在任何均衡中都存在CSF抽取。在可观察私人价值的情况下,在某个均衡中存在CSF抽取;在任何均衡中存在CSF抽取当且仅当竞争者的数量大于或等于3或者值是齐次的。在不可观测私人价值的情况下,在某些均衡中不存在CSF抽取。当提取CSF存在时,我们明确地呈现其中之一。
英文摘要:
We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that extract contestants' prize values. In the common-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium. In the observable-private-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in some equilibrium; there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. In the unobservable-private-value case, there exists no CSF extractive in some equilibrium. When extractive CSFs exist, we explicitly present one of them.
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