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arXiv 2109.03179cs.GTecon.TH
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有阈值目标的比赛设计

Contest Design with Threshold Objectives

University of Oxford(牛津大学);Northwestern University(西北大学)

Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg

AI总结:

本文研究了具有阈值目标的比赛设计,探讨了二进制和线性阈值目标下的比赛机制,旨在最大化设计者的效用并高效计算最优方案。

摘要:

我们研究了设计者的目标是最大化总产出的扩展形式的比赛:如果玩家的产出非常低或非常高,设计者从玩家的产出中获得零边际效用。我们考虑了这两种设定的两种变体,对应于两种目标函数:二进制阈值,其中设计者的效用随着超过某个阈值的玩家数量的增加而非递减;以及线性阈值,其中玩家对设计者效用的贡献在其产出在下限和上限之间时与产出成线性关系,而在低于下限或高于上限时变为常数。对于这两种目标,我们研究了排名顺序分配比赛和一般比赛。我们 characterize 了最大化设计者目标的比赛,并指示了高效计算它们的技术。

英文摘要:

We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We consider two variants of this setting, which correspond to two objective functions: binary threshold, where the designer's utility is a non-decreasing function of the number of players with output above a certain threshold; and linear threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is linear in her output if the output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study rank-order allocation contests and general contests. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer's objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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