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arXiv 2510.07906econ.TH
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相关完美均衡

Correlated Perfect Equilibrium

University of Queensland(昆士兰大学);Monash University(莫纳什大学)

J. Jude Kline, Wanying Huang, Priscilla Man

AI总结:

本文提出基于中介者错误的相关完美均衡(CPE),证明其非空且为有限凸集并集,不赋予弱支配策略正概率,并通过例子与两种现有精炼区分。

摘要:

我们提出了一种基于中介者错误的相关均衡的精炼,称为相关完美均衡(CPE)。在有限博弈中,CPE集合非空,并构成有限个凸集的并集。与完美均衡类似,CPE绝不会对任何弱支配策略赋予正概率。我们提供了CPE的对偶表示,并通过例子展示了它与两种现有的相关均衡精炼——可接受相关均衡(Myerson, 1986)和完美直接相关均衡(Dhillon-Mertens, 1996)——的不同之处。

英文摘要:

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on common perturbations of the mediator's recommendation distribution, which we call correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPEs is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex polyhedra. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE, which yields an iterative procedure for identifying CPEs. These perturbations provide a common source of off-equilibrium beliefs, a feature that distinguishes CPE from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium---acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996)---as we demonstrate through examples.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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