完美的投标人串通通过贿赂和要求
Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
摘要:
本文研究了动态环境下两个投标人参与的二价拍卖中的合谋问题。一个投标人可以向对手提出一个要么接受要么放弃的共谋建议,其中包括提供贿赂和请求贿赂。我们发现,总是存在一个鲁棒均衡,其中合谋成功的概率是1。在均衡中,对于每种类型的发起人,预期收益通常高于单一期权模型(Esö and Schummer(2004))的任何稳健均衡以及我们模型中的任何其他分离均衡。
英文摘要:
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion success probability is one. In the equilibrium, for each type of initiator the expected payoff is generally higher than the counterpart in any robust equilibria of the single-option model (Esö and Schummer (2004)) and any other separating equilibria in our model.
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