研发溢出与区域创新的关系:通过版税许可的专利授权与斯塔克尔伯格双头垄断下的子博弈完美纳什均衡
The relationship between R&D spillovers and regional innovation: Licensing patents through royalties and the Stackelberg duopoly with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
AI总结:
本文通过博弈论分析了研发溢出对希腊区域创新的影响,发现高技能就业和研发支出对区域创新有显著促进作用。
摘要:
本文研究了2002-2010年间希腊研发溢出对区域创新的影响。所采用的方法超越了区域知识生产函数,从更广泛的研发相关和区域结构变量中寻找可能的解释。通过运用博弈论技术来描述通过版税许可专利,并在斯塔克尔伯格双头垄断下推导出子博弈完美纳什均衡,所得结果与以往研究在研发支出相关变量上的发现一致,并进一步表明高技能就业在促进区域创新中起着关键作用。结果还表明,制造业研发人员之间的协同效应以及其他高技能就业措施、公共部门研发支出和制造业企业研发就业对区域创新具有益处。
英文摘要:
The present paper examines the effect of R&D spillovers on regional innovation in Greece over the 2002-2010 period. The approach taken goes beyond a regional knowledge production function and draws possible explanations from a more extensive pool of R&D related and regional structural variables. Having employed game theory techniques in order to describe the licensing of the patents through royalties and derived the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under a Stackelberg duopoly, the results obtained accord with findings of previous studies when it comes R&D expenditure related variables and further suggest that the role of highly-qualified employment is instrumental in promoting regional innovation. The results also suggest the benefits of synergies between R&D personnel in manufacturing and other measures of highly-qualified employment as well as R&D expenditure of the public sector and employment in manufacturing business R&D for regional innovation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。