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arXiv 2604.09460econ.TH
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关于保守稳定行为标准与完美联盟均衡的稳定性

On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium

Pennsylvania State University(宾夕法尼亚州立大学);Michigan State University(密歇根州立大学)

S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu

AI总结:

本文证明在Greenberg(1989)的联盟重复博弈情境中,非歧视性保守稳定行为标准是完美联盟均衡路径的子集,并指出完美联盟均衡路径本身即为非歧视性保守稳定行为标准,是其最大集合。

摘要:

我们证明在Greenberg(1989)的联盟重复博弈情境中,每一个非歧视性保守稳定行为标准都是完美联盟均衡(Ali和Liu,2026)路径的子集。此外,完美联盟均衡路径本身是一个非歧视性保守稳定行为标准。因此,完美联盟均衡路径即为最大的非歧视性保守稳定行为标准。

英文摘要:

We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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