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arXiv 2607.06282econ.TH
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相关均衡的公理

Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium

University of Bonn(波恩大学)

Florian Brandl

AI总结:

研究有限正规形式博弈中的相关均衡,通过将相关策略作为行动建议,给出其公理刻画,从不推荐纯策略占优行动等,还识别出粗糙相关均衡,在特定条件下推荐占优行动并视收益等价行动为强可互换。

摘要:

我们刻画了有限正规形式博弈中的相关均衡。将相关策略解释为行动建议,我们表明相关均衡是唯一的解概念,它从不推荐纯策略占优行动,对收益等价行动一视同仁,并在收益和相关装置存在不确定性时尊重确定性原则。一个平行的刻画在解概念中识别出粗糙相关均衡,这些解概念在存在占优行动时推荐占优行动,并将收益等价行动视为强可互换的。

英文摘要:

We characterize correlated equilibrium in finite normal-form games. Interpreting correlated strategies as action recommendations, we show that correlated equilibrium is the unique solution concept that never recommends a pure-strategy dominated action, treats payoff-equivalent actions interchangeably, and respects the sure-thing principle under uncertainty about payoffs and the correlation device. A parallel characterization identifies coarse correlated equilibrium among solution concepts that recommend dominant actions whenever they exist and treat payoff-equivalent actions as strongly interchangeable.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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