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arXiv 2505.03428cs.GT
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空投博弈

Airdrop Games

Sotiris Georganas, Aggelos Kiayias, Paolo Penna

AI总结:

本文提出空投博弈的博弈论模型,研究设计者如何选择参与方并分配代币,以引导系统走向好的均衡并提升系统价值。

摘要:

启动一个新的区块链系统或应用通常借助所谓的空投(airdrop)来推进,系统设计者会挑选一组预先存在的、可能感兴趣的参与方,并将新铸造的代币分配给他们,期望这些参与方会参与该系统——这种参与,尤其是达到显著水平的参与,能够促进系统发展,提升系统价值以及新铸造代币的价值,从而使空投接收者受益。在这一情境下,许多具有挑战性的问题困扰着设计者,例如如何选择感兴趣的参与方集合,以及如何向他们分配代币。为了解决这些问题,我们提出了一个针对此类空投博弈的博弈论模型。我们的模型可以根据系统价值对参与的依赖方式(在我们的框架中通过“技术函数”建模)以及参与者承担的成本,来指导设计者的选择。我们识别了坏的均衡和好的均衡,并确定了设计者能够以高效方式影响参与者走向好的均衡的情境和可选策略。

英文摘要:

Launching a new blockchain system or application is frequently facilitated by a so called airdrop, where the system designer chooses a pre-existing set of potentially interested parties and allocates newly minted tokens to them with the expectation that they will participate in the system - such engagement, especially if it is of significant level, facilitates the system and raises its value and also the value of its newly minted token, hence benefiting the airdrop recipients. A number of challenging questions befuddle designers in this setting, such as how to choose the set of interested parties and how to allocate tokens to them. To address these considerations we put forward a game-theoretic model for such airdrop games. Our model can be used to guide the designer's choices based on the way the system's value depends on participation (modeled by a ''technology function'' in our framework) and the costs that participants incur. We identify both bad and good equilibria and identify the settings and the choices that can be made where the designer can influence the players towards good equilibria in an expedient manner.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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