通过补贴实现网络设计博弈中的有效均衡
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
摘要：
网络的有效设计一直是一个重要的工程任务，涉及具有挑战性的组合优化问题。典型地，网络设计者必须在若干备选方案中选择要建立哪些链路，使得所得到的网络满足给定的一组连接性要求，并且建立网络链路的成本尽可能低。最小生成树问题是一个很好的例子。在本文中，我们考虑的自然场景中，连接的要求是由自私的用户谁同意分享网络的成本建立根据一个定义明确的规则。网络设计者提出的设计方案现在不仅要符合连通性要求，还要符合用户的自私性。从本质上讲，用户是所谓的网络设计游戏中的玩家，网络设计师必须提出一个设计，这是这个游戏的均衡。当自私开始起作用时，通常情况下，这种均衡可能是次优的。在本文中，我们考虑以下问题：网络设计者可以强制执行特定的设计作为均衡或保证有效的设计是一致的用户的自私适当补贴的一些网络链接？在试图理解这个问题，我们制定相应的优化问题，并提出积极和消极的结果。
英文摘要：
The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
