TierDrop:利用空投农民实现用户增长
Platform Building with Fake Users: On Airdrop Farmers and Activity Procurement
AI总结:
本文提出TierDrop框架,论证在竞争平台市场中,空投发行方利用农民产生网络效应以吸引真实用户可能是收入最优策略,而非一味对抗农民。
摘要:
区块链平台试图通过向用户发放代币来扩大用户基础,这种做法被称为发放空投。实证数据和相关工作表明,以往的空投未能实现其吸引长期用户的既定目标,部分原因在于对抗性的农民利用空投机制漏洞,获得了不成比例的超额奖励。在本文中,我们主张,鉴于对抗农民徒劳无功,空投的商业模式应当被重新审视:应当利用农民来产生能够吸引真实用户的活动,即增强网络效应。为了理解农民对空投的影响,我们分析了他们在由两个竞争平台和两类用户——真实用户与农民——构成的市场中的表现。我们证明,与直觉相反,农民有时代表一种“必要的恶”——对于空投发行方而言,将部分代币给予农民可能是收入最优的,即使在平台可以无成本地检测并驱逐所有农民的假设情形下也是如此。尽管我们聚焦于空投,但我们的结果普遍适用于基于活动的激励方案。
英文摘要:
Digital platforms reward observable claims to build their user base. Because claims are imperfect proxies for people, these programs attract bonus hunters and airdrop farmers, who are usually treated as leakage and screened out. We show that screening can be too aggressive when eligibility requires a separable platform-building input. In a monopolist model, fixed per-claim rewards cannot implement finite farmer activity: rewards below farmer cost induce no entry, while rewards above cost induce unbounded entry. A shared pool can succeed because it makes claims rivalrous. Entry dilutes the pool until the per-claim reward equals claim cost, converting the program into identity-blind procurement. In the baseline model, all farmer-created claims have the same lower cost, while all organic claims have the same higher cost; farmers therefore supply the activity. Organic users receive no rewards but benefit from higher quality, so perfect screening can reduce platform profit and organic-user payoffs. In case when primary organic claims are cheaper but additional organic identities cost more than farmer claims, a small pool attracts only organic claims, whereas a larger pool recruits farmers to expand activity. The mechanism applies to separable inputs (e.g., liquidity, inventory, and data) rather than rewards for regular use or mechanical claim creation. Thus, weak identity changes both leakage and how platforms procure growth.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。