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arXiv 2001.03132econ.THcs.GT
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网络中的捉迷藏游戏

A game of hide and seek in networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubinski

摘要:

我们提出并研究了一个隐藏在网络中的战略模型,网络设计者选择的链接和他在网络中的位置,面对搜索者检查和破坏网络。我们的特点是最佳网络的隐藏,以及平衡隐藏和寻求这些网络上的战略。我们证明了最优网络是等价于核心-外围网络的循环或变体,其中外围的每个节点都连接到核心中的单个节点。

英文摘要:

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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