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arXiv 1202.3480cs.GT
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在社交计算中实现最佳结果:博弈论方法

Implementing Optimal Outcomes in Social Computing: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Arpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel

摘要:

在许多社交计算应用程序中,例如在线问答论坛,每个任务的最佳贡献都会获得较高的奖励,而所有剩余的贡献都会获得相同的较低奖励,而不管它们的实际质量如何。假设一个机制设计者(网站所有者)希望优化一个目标,这个目标是收到的贡献的数量和质量的函数。当潜在的贡献者是战略代理人,他们决定是否贡献或不自私地最大化自己的效用,这样的“最佳贡献”机制,M_B,足以实现一个结果,这是最佳的机制设计者?我们首先表明,在设置的贡献的价值主要是由代理人的专业知识,代理人只战略性地选择是否作出贡献或不,比赛可以实现最佳的结果:对于任何合理的目标,奖励的最佳和剩余的贡献在M_B总是可以选择,使结果在唯一的对称均衡M_B最大化的机制设计者的效用。我们还展示了如何机制设计者可以学习这些最优奖励时,她不知道的参数的代理商的效用,可能是在实践中的情况。接下来,我们考虑设置贡献的价值取决于贡献者的专业知识以及她的努力,和代理内生地选择多少努力,除了决定是否作出贡献。在这里,我们表明,最佳的结果永远不能实现的比赛,如果系统可以排名的贡献的质量完美。然而,如果在贡献的排名中存在噪声,那么机制设计者可以再次诱导代理遵循使其效用最大化的策略。因此,当努力是内生的并影响质量时,不完美的排名实际上可以帮助实现最佳结果的可执行性。

英文摘要:

In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities. Suppose a mechanism designer (site owner) wishes to optimize an objective that is some function of the number and qualities of received contributions. When potential contributors are strategic agents, who decide whether to contribute or not to selfishly maximize their own utilities, is such a "best contribution" mechanism, M_B, adequate to implement an outcome that is optimal for the mechanism designer? We first show that in settings where a contribution's value is determined primarily by an agent's expertise, and agents only strategically choose whether to contribute or not, contests can implement optimal outcomes: for any reasonable objective, the rewards for the best and remaining contributions in M_B can always be chosen so that the outcome in the unique symmetric equilibrium of M_B maximizes the mechanism designer's utility. We also show how the mechanism designer can learn these optimal rewards when she does not know the parameters of the agents' utilities, as might be the case in practice. We next consider settings where a contribution's value depends on both the contributor's expertise as well as her effort, and agents endogenously choose how much effort to exert in addition to deciding whether to contribute. Here, we show that optimal outcomes can never be implemented by contests if the system can rank the qualities of contributions perfectly. However, if there is noise in the contributions' rankings, then the mechanism designer can again induce agents to follow strategies that maximize his utility. Thus imperfect rankings can actually help achieve implementability of optimal outcomes when effort is endogenous and influences quality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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