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arXiv 2106.12329econ.THcs.GT
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COVID-19时代的博弈:推进大流行应对的机制设计

Games in the Time of COVID-19: Promoting Mechanism Design for Pandemic Response

Balázs Pejó, Gergely Biczók

摘要:

大多数政府采用一套准标准措施对抗COVID-19,包括戴口罩、保持社交距离、病毒检测、接触者追踪和接种疫苗。然而,将这些措施结合成一个有效的整体大流行病应对工具的难度比预期的还要大。我们认为,这些措施的不同有效性背后的一些重要因素是自私的决策和不同的国家实施的响应机制。在本文中,通过简单的游戏,我们展示了个人激励对戴口罩,社交距离和疫苗接种决策的影响,以及这些如何导致次优结果。我们还展示了国家当局在设计这些游戏时的责任,包括数据透明度,所选择的政策及其对首选结果的影响。我们提倡一种机制设计方法:在实施各自的大流行应对机制时,认真平衡社会公益和应对成本,符合各国政府的最佳利益;此外,在设计有效的解决方案时,没有一刀切的解决方案。

英文摘要:

Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19 including wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing, contact tracing, and vaccination. However, combining these measures into an efficient holistic pandemic response instrument is even more involved than anticipated. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we show the effect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to mask wearing, social distancing and vaccination, and how these may result in sub-optimal outcomes. We also demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding data transparency, the chosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism; moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all solution when designing an effective solution.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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