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arXiv 2404.08758physics.soc-ph

流行病社会结构模型中非药物干预的平均场博弈方法

Mean Field Game Approach to Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions in a Social Structure model of Epidemics

Louis Bremaud, Olivier Giraud, Denis Ullmo

AI总结:

本研究构建结合年龄分层社会结构的SIR平均场博弈模型,分析个体行为与流行病传播的相互作用,对比纳什均衡与社会最优成本,探讨封控政策的干预效果及参数变化引发的策略相变,为非药物干预公共政策评估提供理论框架。

摘要:

设计连贯且高效的传染病应对政策及其相关措施,不仅需要对流行病传播动力学建模,还需对个体行为建模,因为后者对前者有极强影响。本研究针对这一问题提出了一个考虑人口社会结构的理论模型。该模型基于SIR仓室模型的平均场博弈(Mean Field Game)版本,其中个体按年龄组划分,并在不同场景中发生互动。这种社会异质性既能复现现实情境,又能保持实际可用性。在我们的博弈论方法中,个体可以通过在感染风险与隔离成本之间进行权衡,选择限制自身社交接触。所有个体的选择与优化行为通过一组耦合方程形成纳什均衡,我们推导了这组方程并进行了数值求解。随后,我们将该场景下人口承担的总体成本与社会最优成本(即从社会视角出发的最优成本)进行对比,并研究了在政府机构实施封控的约束性纳什均衡下,两种成本之间的差距可被部分缩小的机制。最后,我们考察了人口规模N的有限性,以及外部事件终结流行病的时间T所带来的影响,证明这些参数的变化可能导致最优策略选择中出现一阶相变。本文中所有用于缓解流行病的策略均属于非药物干预(NPI),我们提供了一个理论框架,可用于评估取决于流行病特征与社会限制成本的公共政策指导方针。

英文摘要:

The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our work, we provide a theoretical model for this problem, taking into account the social structure of a population. This model is based on a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. This social heterogeneity allows to reproduce realistic situations while remaining usable in practice. In our game theoretical approach, individuals can choose to limit their contacts by making a trade-off between the risks incurred by infection and the cost of being confined. The aggregation of all these individual choices and optimizations forms a Nash equilibrium through a system of coupled equations that we derive and solve numerically. The global cost born by the population within this scenario is then compared to its societal optimum counterpart (i.e. the optimal cost from the society viewpoint), and we investigate how the gap between these two costs can be partially bridged within a constrained Nash equilibrium for which a governmental institution would impose lockdowns. Finally we consider the consequences of the finiteness of the population size $N$, or of a time $T$ at which an external event would end the epidemic, and show that the variation of these parameters could lead to first order phase transitions in the choice of optimal strategies. In this paper, all the strategies considered to mitigate epidemics correspond to non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI), and we provide here a theoretical framework within which guidelines for public policies depending on the characteristics of an epidemic and on the cost of restrictions on the society could be assessed.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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