arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2402.02428eess.SYcs.GTcs.SY

批发电力市场中战略储能运营的稳定性(扩展版)

On the Stability of Strategic Energy Storage Operation in Wholesale Electricity Markets (Extended Version)

Aviad Navon, Juri Belikov, Ariel Orda, Yoash Levron

AI总结:

本研究用博弈论模型分析批发电力市场中储能竞争,发现高比例可再生能源与低灵活性常规电厂组合下系统不稳定,而价格上限可确保稳定,且低灵活性下储能套利盈利性下降。

摘要:

高比例的可变可再生能源需要大量的储能容量。然而,如何设计一个市场,一方面确保储能企业获得稳定且充足的收入,另一方面维持消费者稳定且可负担的电力成本,仍不清楚。在此,我们使用博弈论模型研究批发电力市场中的储能竞争。一个主要结果是这类博弈不一定稳定。特别是,我们发现,在特定条件下,即高比例的可变可再生能源与常规电厂低灵活性相结合时,系统不会收敛到均衡。然而,我们证明对储能报价设置价格上限可以确保收敛到稳定解。此外,我们发现,当常规电厂灵活性较低时,虽然储能用于能源平衡的使用随可再生能源发电量增加而增加,但仅用于能源套利的储能盈利性却下降。

英文摘要:

High shares of variable renewable energy necessitate substantial energy storage capacity. However, it remains unclear how to design a market that, on the one hand, ensures a stable and sufficient income for storage firms, and, on the other hand, maintains stable and affordable electricity costs for the consumers. Here, we use a game theoretic model to study storage competition in wholesale electricity markets. A main result is that these types of games are not necessarily stable. In particular, we find that under certain conditions, which imply a combination of a high share of variable renewable energy sources and low flexibility of conventional power plants, the system will not converge to an equilibrium. However, we demonstrate that a price cap on storage price bids can ensure convergence to a stable solution. Moreover, we find that when the flexibility of conventional power plants is low, while the storage usage for energy balancing increases with renewable energy generation, the profitability of using storage for the sole purpose of energy arbitrage decreases.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑