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arXiv 2306.14799cs.LGcs.GT
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关于平均场博弈中的模仿

On Imitation in Mean-field Games

ETH AI Center(苏黎世联邦理工学院人工智能中心);MPI for Intelligent Systems(马克斯·普朗克智能系统研究所);Google DeepMind(谷歌DeepMind);ETH Zurich(苏黎世联邦理工学院);NYU Shanghai(上海纽约大学)

Giorgia Ramponi, Pavel Kolev, Olivier Pietquin, Niao He, Mathieu Laurière, Matthieu Geist

AI总结:

研究平均场博弈中的模仿学习问题,提出纳什模仿差距概念,并发现当动力学依赖种群分布时,需用平均场控制替代强化学习以解决IL难题。

摘要:

我们探讨了平均场博弈(MFGs)背景下的模仿学习(IL)问题,其目标是模仿一群遵循某个未知收益函数的纳什均衡策略的智能体行为。与单智能体IL相比,MFGs中的IL带来了新的挑战,特别是当奖励函数和转移核都依赖于种群分布时。在本文中,不同于现有的关于MFGs中IL的文献,我们引入了一种称为纳什模仿差距的新解概念。然后我们证明,当只有奖励依赖于种群分布时,MFGs中的IL可以简化为具有类似保证的单智能体IL。然而,当动力学依赖于种群时,我们提供了一个新颖的上界,表明在此设定下IL更加困难。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一种新的对抗性公式,其中强化学习问题被平均场控制(MFC)问题所替代,这表明MFGs中IL的进展可能必须建立在MFC的基础之上。

英文摘要:

We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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