Unbeatable Imitation
University of Heidelberg（海德堡大学）；University of California, Davis（加州大学戴维斯分校）
英文摘要：
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
