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arXiv 2305.09433cs.CR
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变革之时:时钟如何破坏UWB安全测距

Time for Change: How Clocks Break UWB Secure Ranging

Claudio Anliker, Giovanni Camurati, Srdjan Capkun

AI总结:

本文发现收发器时钟缺陷是UWB安全测距的新漏洞,提出Mix-Down和Stretch-and-Advance两种攻击,分别将距离缩减至0米和超90米,并给出有效对策。

摘要:

由于其适用于无线测距,超宽带(UWB)在过去几年中获得了广泛关注。UWB芯片已被集成到消费电子产品中,并被考虑用于安全相关的用例,如访问控制或非接触式支付。然而,最近的多篇出版物表明,在物理层保护实例测量的完整性是困难的。在本文中,我们将收发器时钟 imperfections 确定为一个新的、迄今被广泛忽视的重要参数。我们提出了 Mix-Down 和 Stretch-and-Advance 两种新型攻击,分别针对当前(IEEE 802.15.4z)和即将推出的(IEEE 802.15.4ab)UWB标准。我们在商用芯片上演示了 Mix-Down 攻击,实现了从10米到0米的距离缩减。对于 Stretch-and-Advance 攻击,我们分析表明,当前 IEEE 802.15.4ab 的提案允许超过90米的缩减。为了防止该攻击,我们提出并分析了一种有效的对策。

英文摘要:

Due to its suitability for wireless ranging, Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) has gained traction over the past years. UWB chips have been integrated into consumer electronics and considered for security-relevant use cases, such as access control or contactless payments. However, several publications in the recent past have shown that it is difficult to protect the integrity of instance measurements on the physical layer. In this paper, we identify transceiver clock imperfections as a new, important parameter that has been widely ignored so far. We present Mix-Down and Stretch-and-Advance, two novel attacks against the current (IEEE 802.15.4z) and the upcoming (IEEE 802.15.4ab) UWB standard, respectively. We demonstrate Mix-Down on commercial chips and achieve distance reduction from 10 m to 0 m. For the Stretch-and-Advance attack, we show analytically that the current proposal of IEEE 802.15.4ab allows reductions of over 90 m. In order to prevent the attack, we propose and analyze an effective countermeasure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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