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arXiv 2111.05313cs.CR
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鬼峰:对抗HRP UWB测距的实用距离缩减攻击

Ghost Peak: Practical Distance Reduction Attacks Against HRP UWB Ranging

Patrick Leu, Giovanni Camurati, Alexander Heinrich, Marc Roeschlin, Claudio Anliker, Matthias Hollick, Srdjan Capkun, Jiska Classen

摘要:

我们提出了第一个无线攻击IEEE 802.15.4z高速率脉冲重复频率(HRP)超宽带(UWB)距离测量系统。具体来说,我们展示了一个实际的距离减少攻击对苹果U1芯片(嵌入在iPhone和AirTags),以及对U1芯片与恩智浦和Qorvo UWB芯片互操作。这些芯片已被广泛部署在手机和汽车中,以确保汽车进入和启动的安全,并预计用于安全的非接触式支付、家庭锁和接触追踪系统。我们的攻击在没有任何加密材料知识的情况下操作,导致距离从12米(实际距离)减少到0米(欺骗距离),攻击成功概率高达4%,并且只需要一个便宜的(65美元)现成的设备。访问控制只能容忍次秒延迟,以不给用户带来不便,几乎没有留下执行耗时验证的余地。这些距离的减少带来的问题UWB HRP在安全关键应用程序中的使用。

英文摘要:

We present the first over-the-air attack on IEEE 802.15.4z High-Rate Pulse Repetition Frequency (HRP) Ultra-WideBand (UWB) distance measurement systems. Specifically, we demonstrate a practical distance reduction attack against pairs of Apple U1 chips (embedded in iPhones and AirTags), as well as against U1 chips inter-operating with NXP and Qorvo UWB chips. These chips have been deployed in a wide range of phones and cars to secure car entry and start and are projected for secure contactless payments, home locks, and contact tracing systems. Our attack operates without any knowledge of cryptographic material, results in distance reductions from 12m (actual distance) to 0m (spoofed distance) with attack success probabilities of up to 4%, and requires only an inexpensive (USD 65) off-the-shelf device. Access control can only tolerate sub-second latencies to not inconvenience the user, leaving little margin to perform time-consuming verifications. These distance reductions bring into question the use of UWB HRP in security-critical applications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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