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arXiv 2406.06252eess.SPcs.CR
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抵御 UWB 测距中距离攻击的弹性随机跳时回复

Resilient Random Time-hopping Reply against Distance Attacks in UWB Ranging

Wenlong Gou, Chuanhang Yu, Gang Wu

AI总结:

针对 UWB 测距距离缩减攻击,提出无冗余开销且兼容 IEEE 802.15.4a/z 的随机跳时安全测距与攻击检测方案,可将 Ghost Peak 攻击成功率降至 0.01% 以下。

摘要:

为缓解超宽带(Ultra-Wide Band,UWB)测距中的距离缩减攻击,本文提出一种基于随机跳时机制的安全测距方案,且不会产生额外信令开销。此外,本文设计了一种安全测距策略,以向后兼容 IEEE 802.15.4a/z 等现有标准,并结合了攻击检测方案。在 Patrick Leu 等人所展示的 Ghost Peak 攻击情形下,仿真和实验结果均证明了所提策略的有效性与可行性。经验证,随机跳时机制能够将距离缩减攻击的成功率降至 0.01% 以下,从而显著增强 UWB 测距的安全性。

英文摘要:

In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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