交替步长（r，s）生成器的代数攻击
Algebraic Attack on the Alternating Step(r,s)Generator
摘要：
交替步进（r，s）发生器（ASG（r，s））是A.坎索它由长度为l、m和n位的三个寄存器组成。第一个寄存器控制其他两个寄存器的时钟。其他两个寄存器被时钟控制r次（或不被时钟控制）（分别为s次或不计时），这取决于第一寄存器中的时钟控制位。特殊情况r=s=1是原始的和众所周知的交替步骤发生器。Kanso声称没有针对ASG（r，s）的有效攻击，因为r和s是保密的。本文提出了一种交替步生成器ASG模型，并对ASG（r，s）提出了一种新的有效的代数攻击，利用3（m+n）比特的输出序列来寻找秘密密钥，计算复杂度为O（（m^2+n^2）*2^{l+1}+（2^{m-1}）*m^3 +（2^{n-1}）*n^3）计算复杂性.我们表明，这个系统是没有更安全的比原来的ASG，在相反的ASG（r，s）的构造器的要求。
英文摘要：
The Alternating Step(r,s) Generator, ASG(r,s), is a clock-controlled sequence generator which is recently proposed by A. Kanso. It consists of three registers of length l, m and n bits. The first register controls the clocking of the two others. The two other registers are clocked r times (or not clocked) (resp. s times or not clocked) depending on the clock-control bit in the first register. The special case r=s=1 is the original and well known Alternating Step Generator. Kanso claims there is no efficient attack against the ASG(r,s) since r and s are kept secret. In this paper, we present an Alternating Step Generator, ASG, model for the ASG(r,s) and also we present a new and efficient algebraic attack on ASG(r,s) using 3(m+n) bits of the output sequence to find the secret key with O((m^2+n^2)*2^{l+1}+ (2^{m-1})*m^3 + (2^{n-1})*n^3) computational complexity. We show that this system is no more secure than the original ASG, in contrast to the claim of the ASG(r,s)'s constructor.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
