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arXiv 1303.0346cs.CRcs.ITmath.IT
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利用物理信道特性的安全距离边界验证

Secure Distance Bounding Verification using Physical-Channel Properties

Hadi Ahmadi, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

摘要:

我们考虑的问题的距离边界验证(DBV),证明方声称的距离和验证方确保证明是在声称的距离。目前的“安全”距离估计方法使用信号的飞行时间,这需要验证者具有准确的时钟。我们研究安全DBV使用物理信道属性作为替代时间测量。我们考虑一个信号传播环境,衰减信号作为距离的函数,然后通过加性噪声破坏它。我们考虑了三种攻击DBV的情况,即距离欺诈(DFA),黑手党欺诈(MFA)和恐怖主义欺诈(TFA)攻击。我们表明,它是可能的构造高效的DBV协议与DFA和MFA安全,即使对一个无界的对手;另一方面,它是不可能的设计TFA-安全的协议,没有时间测量,即使与计算有界的对手。然而,我们提供了一个TFA-安全的构造的条件下,对手的通信能力是有限的有界检索模型(BRM)。我们使用数值分析来研究引入DBV协议的通信复杂性。我们讨论了我们的结果,并为未来的研究方向。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of distance bounding verification (DBV), where a proving party claims a distance and a verifying party ensures that the prover is within the claimed distance. Current approaches to "secure" distance estimation use signal's time of flight, which requires the verifier to have an accurate clock. We study secure DBV using physical channel properties as an alternative to time measurement. We consider a signal propagation environment that attenuates signal as a function of distance, and then corrupts it by an additive noise. We consider three attacking scenarios against DBV, namely distance fraud (DFA), mafia fraud (MFA) and terrorist fraud (TFA) attacks. We show it is possible to construct efficient DBV protocols with DFA and MFA security, even against an unbounded adversary; on the other hand, it is impossible to design TFA-secure protocols without time measurement, even with a computationally-bounded adversary. We however provide a TFA-secure construction under the condition that the adversary's communication capability is limited to the bounded retrieval model (BRM). We use numerical analysis to examine the communication complexity of the introduced DBV protocols. We discuss our results and give directions for future research.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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