诅咒序贯均衡
Cursed Sequential Equilibrium
AI总结:
本文将诅咒均衡扩展到多阶段博弈,提出诅咒序贯均衡(CSE),通过行为策略与序贯理性刻画,并在信号博弈、声誉建立、序贯投票等应用中揭示其与贝叶斯纳什均衡的系统性行为差异。
摘要:
本文构建了一个框架,将 Eyster 和 Rabin(2005)提出的诅咒均衡(CE)的策略式分析扩展到多阶段博弈。该方法使用行为策略而非标准式混合策略,并施加序贯理性。我们定义了诅咒序贯均衡(CSE),并将其与序贯均衡和标准的标准式 CE 进行比较。我们给出了 CSE 的一般刻画,并建立了其性质。我们将 CSE 应用于经济学和政治学中的五个应用场景。这些应用展示了 CSE 与贝叶斯纳什均衡或 CE 之间的广泛差异:在信号博弈中;在带有博弈前沟通的博弈中;在声誉建立中;在序贯投票中;以及在高阶信念起关键作用的脏脸博弈中。这些应用中的几个共同主题是展示在具有私人价值的动态不完全信息博弈中,CSE 如何以及为何意味着与贝叶斯纳什均衡系统性地不同的行为,而对于此类博弈,CE 与贝叶斯纳什均衡一致。
英文摘要:
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavioral strategies rather than normal form mixed strategies, and imposes sequential rationality. We define cursed sequential equilibrium (CSE) and compare it to sequential equilibrium and standard normal-form CE. We provide a general characterization of CSE and establish its properties. We apply CSE to five applications in economics and political science. These applications illustrate a wide range of differences between CSE and Bayesian Nash equilibrium or CE: in signaling games; games with preplay communication; reputation building; sequential voting; and the dirty faces game where higher order beliefs play a key role. A common theme in several of these applications is showing how and why CSE implies systematically different behavior than Bayesian Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of incomplete information with private values, while CE coincides with Bayesian Nash equilibrium for such games.
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