补贴顺序搜索
Subsidizing Sequential Search
AI总结:
研究企业通过补贴消费者搜索成本来竞争注意力的市场,建立补贴排序原则,并证明在直觉准则下存在唯一均衡,该均衡最大化信息揭示并确保有效搜索,随后分析AI中介平台的最优线性定价导致过度搜索。
摘要:
我们研究企业通过补贴昂贵的产品检查来竞争消费者注意力的市场。这些补贴不改变产品质量,但通过降低检查成本来改变消费者搜索的顺序。我们建立了一个补贴排序原则:在任何均衡中,更高质量的企业提供弱更大的补贴,导致消费者按补贴降序搜索。在直觉准则的精神下,前向归纳推理唯一幸存下来的均衡是:低质量企业从未被检查,中等质量企业以严格递增的补贴分离,高质量企业以全额补贴聚集。该均衡在所有可能的结果中最大化信息揭示,并确保有效的检查。然后,我们将分析扩展到能够创建和定价检查代币的AI中介平台。平台的最优线性定价导致相对于社会最优的过度检查。虽然这种扭曲不会降低消费者福利,但它将剩余从卖家重新分配给平台和消费者。
英文摘要:
We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We establish a subsidy-sorting principle: in any equilibrium, higher-quality firms provide weakly larger subsidies, leading consumers to search in descending subsidy order. A unique equilibrium survives forward-induction reasoning in the spirit of the Intuitive Criterion: low-quality firms are never inspected, intermediate-quality firms separate with strictly increasing subsidies, and high-quality firms pool at the full subsidy. This equilibrium maximizes information revelation among all possible outcomes and ensures efficient inspection. We then extend the analysis to AI-mediated platforms that can create and price inspection tokens. The platform's optimal linear pricing leads to excessive inspection relative to the social optimum. While this distortion does not reduce consumer welfare, it reallocates surplus from sellers to the platform and consumers.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。