序贯行动博弈下的机制设计:显示原理
Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle
AI总结:
本文研究序贯行动博弈下的机制设计,针对一般解概念给出两个显示原理结论:可加解概念下序贯与同时行动博弈实施等价;单调解概念下社会选择函数的序贯可实施性等价于对应规范算子的可实现性,简化了机制设计问题。
摘要:
传统机制设计聚焦于同时行动博弈(例如Myerson (1981)的研究)。本文研究序贯行动博弈下的机制设计,并针对一般解概念(如完美贝叶斯均衡、显然占优、强显然占优)给出两个关于显示原理的结论。首先,若某解概念是可加的,则序贯行动博弈中的可实施性与同时行动博弈中的可实施性等价。其次,对任意解概念ρ和任意社会选择函数f,我们定义了一个基于基元的规范算子γ^(ρ,f)。我们证明,若ρ是单调的,则f可由序贯行动博弈实施当且仅当γ^(ρ,f)是可实现的,这将复杂的机制设计问题转化为检验基元上定义的若干条件。现有大多数解概念要么是可加的,要么是单调的。
英文摘要:
Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move games. Second, for any solution concept \r{ho} and any social choice function f, we identify a canonical operator γ^{(\r{ho},f)}, which is defined on primitives. We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if γ^{(\r{ho},f)} is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either additive or monotonic.
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