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arXiv 2110.04368econ.TH
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异质信念下的道德风险

Moral Hazard with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Martin Dumav, Urmee Khan, Luca Rigotti

摘要:

我们研究了一个具有异质信念的道德风险模型,其中代理人的每一个行为都产生一对关于输出水平的概率分布,一个代表代理人的信念,另一个代表委托人的信念。代理人的相对乐观或悲观决定了合同是高权力(即工资水平之间的高可变性)还是低权力。当代理人比委托人更加乐观时,风险分担和激励条款之间的权衡就可以消除。使用单调似然比排名模型分歧各方的信念,我们表明,激励措施的方向越来越多的分歧。一般来说,工资制度的形式对信仰的差异很敏感。因此,共同信念下的最优激励合同的关键特征不容易推广到信念异质性的情况。

英文摘要:

We study a model of moral hazard with heterogeneous beliefs where each of agent's actions gives rise to a pair of probability distributions over output levels, one representing the beliefs of the agent and the other those of the principal. The agent's relative optimism or pessimism dictates whether the contract is high-powered (i.e. with high variability between wage levels) or low-powered. When the agent is sufficiently more optimistic than the principal, the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentive provision may be eliminated. Using Monotone Likelihood Ratio ranking to model disagreement in the parties' beliefs, we show that incentives move in the direction of increasing disagreement. In general, the shape of the wage scheme is sensitive to the differences in beliefs. Thereby, key features of optimal incentive contracts under common beliefs do not readily generalize to the case of belief heterogeneity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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