arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2008.09529econ.TH
收藏

在道德风险下的最优评级设计

Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard

Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学)

Maryam Saeedi, Ali Shourideh

AI总结:

本文研究在道德风险和战略操纵下最优评级设计,通过收益函数凹化确定最优评级策略,并探讨不同风险活动对评级策略的影响。

摘要:

我们研究在道德风险和战略操纵下的最优评级设计。中介者观察到努力的噪声指示器,并承诺一种评级政策,以塑造市场信念和报酬。我们通过收益函数的凹化来刻画最优评级。最优评级取决于努力与风险的相互作用:对于增加尾部风险的活动,最优评级表现出较低的 censoring,将较差的结果合并以保险和鼓励冒险;对于减少尾部风险的活动,上 censoring 增加了疏忽的惩罚。在存在窗口打扮的多任务环境中,信息较少的评级会遏制操纵。在再分配测试设计中,最优测试表现出中等 censoring。

英文摘要:

We study optimal rating design under moral hazard and strategic manipulation. An intermediary observes a noisy indicator of effort and commits to a rating policy that shapes market beliefs and pay. Whether optimal ratings reveal or censor information depends on how effort shifts the outcome distribution: when effort increases tail risk, optimal ratings use lower censorship, pooling poor outcomes to encourage risk-taking; when effort reduces tail risk, upper censorship discourages negligence. In multi-task settings with window dressing, a monotone relative informativeness property again delivers upper- or lower-censorship ratings. In an application to redistributive test design, optimal tests can feature mid-censorship. These results follow from a general characterization of optimal ratings via concavification of a gain function, accommodating violations of monotone likelihood ratios and distributional concerns.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑