劳动合同的稳健监管
Robust Regulation of Labour Contracts
AI总结：
研究道德风险下基于最坏情况遗憾的劳动合同Robust Regulation，提出最低计件工资规则以兼顾效率、工人保护与激励。
摘要：
我们研究道德风险问题中Robust Regulation of contracts。企业提出合同以激励受有限责任保护的工人。监管者限制可许可合同集合以(i)提高效率和(ii)保护工人。监管者对工人行动和企业生产成本均面临不确定性，并基于最坏情况遗憾评估监管。遗憾最小化监管规定工人最低计件工资。此规则同时保证工人公平份额并保留足够合同灵活性以提供激励。
英文摘要：
We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii) protect the worker. The regulator faces uncertainty about both the worker's actions and the firm's production cost, and evaluates regulations based on their worst-case regret. The regret-minimising regulation mandates a minimum piece rate compensation for the worker. This rule simultaneously guarantees a fair share for the worker and preserves enough contractual flexibility to provide incentives.
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