最优补偿、有限执行与合同规制
Optimal Defaults, Limited Enforcement and the Regulation of Contracts
摘要：
我们研究政府如何通过契约环境的设计来促进社会福利。我们将契约监管建模为默认委托：政府选择一组它愿意执行的委托合同条款，并影响作为当事人谈判中外部选项的默认条款。我们的分析表明，限制授权集主要减轻外部性，而默认条款主要实现分配目标。将我们的模型应用于劳动合同的监管，我们得到了关于最优默认授权政策的比较静态分析。随着公平问题或外部性的增加，对工人的实物支助也会增加（例如通过福利要求和公共医疗保险）。与此同时，当工人的议价能力从平等下降时，对工人的现金支持就会增加（例如通过现金转移和最低工资法）。
英文摘要：
We study how governments promote social welfare through the design of contracting environments. We model the regulation of contracting as default delegation: the government chooses a delegation set of contract terms it is willing to enforce, and influences the default terms that serve as outside options in parties' negotiations. Our analysis shows that limiting the delegation set principally mitigates externalities, while default terms primarily achieve distributional objectives. Applying our model to the regulation of labor contracts, we derive comparative statics on the optimal default delegation policy. As equity concerns or externalities increase, in-kind support for workers increases (e.g. through benefits requirements and public health insurance). Meanwhile, when worker bargaining power decreases away from parity, support for workers increases in cash (e.g. through cash transfers and minimum wage laws).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
