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arXiv 2103.13969cs.GTcs.CC
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第二价格拍卖的复杂性

The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions

Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar

摘要:

预算约束在在线广告拍卖中是普遍存在的。为了管理这些限制并平滑拍卖中的支出,投标人(或代表他们的平台)通常会使用起搏:每个投标人都会被分配一个介于0和1之间的起搏乘数,她对每个项目的出价都会按起搏乘数成倍地缩小。这自然会产生一个博弈,在这个博弈中,每个投标人都有策略地选择一个乘数。在这个博弈中,均衡的适当概念被称为节奏均衡。在这项工作中,我们表明,找到一个近似的节奏均衡的问题是PPAD完全的第二价格拍卖。这解决了Conitzer et al. [2021]的一个未决问题。作为我们的硬度结果的结果,我们表明,由Borgs等人[2007]介绍的tatonnement风格的拍卖管理动态不太可能有效地收敛重复的第二价格拍卖。这推翻了Borgs等人的猜想。[2007],假设复杂性类PPAD不等于P。我们的硬度结果也意味着存在一个细化的供应感知市场均衡,这是很难用简单的线性效用计算。

英文摘要:

Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a pacing multiplier between zero and one, and her bid on each item is multiplicatively scaled down by the pacing multiplier. This naturally gives rise to a game in which each bidder strategically selects a multiplier. The appropriate notion of equilibrium in this game is known as a pacing equilibrium. In this work, we show that the problem of finding an approximate pacing equilibrium is PPAD-complete for second-price auctions. This resolves an open question of Conitzer et al. [2021]. As a consequence of our hardness result, we show that the tatonnement-style budget-management dynamics introduced by Borgs et al. [2007] are unlikely to converge efficiently for repeated second-price auctions. This disproves a conjecture by Borgs et al. [2007], under the assumption that the complexity class PPAD is not equal to P. Our hardness result also implies the existence of a refinement of supply-aware market equilibria which is hard to compute with simple linear utilities.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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