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arXiv 2003.12095quant-phcs.CR
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关于无纠缠的量子识别

Concerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement

Carlos E. González-Guillén, María Isabel González Vasco, Floyd Johnson, Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo

摘要:

身份识别方案是交互式协议,通常涉及两方,一方是证明者,他希望提供他或她的身份的证据,另一方是验证者,他检查所提供的证据并决定它是否来自预期的证明者。在本文中,我们评论了最近提出的量子身份认证从Zawadzki,并给出了一个具体的攻击维护理论上的不可能性结果从Lo和Buhrman等人。更确切地说,我们表明,使用一个简单的strategyan对手确实可以获得不可忽略的信息共享的身份秘密。虽然量子身份认证方案的安全性在[1]中没有正式定义,但很明显,这样的定义应该以某种方式暗示外部实体可能无法获得共享身份认证方案的信息(即使他积极参与协议执行中的消息注入,这在我们的攻击策略中没有假设)。

英文摘要:

Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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