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arXiv 1908.11568cs.CR
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Pacer:全面的云中网络侧通道缓解

Pacer: Comprehensive Network Side-Channel Mitigation in the Cloud

Aastha Mehta, Mohamed Alzayat, Roberta de Viti, Björn B. Brandenburg, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg

摘要:

网络侧信道(NSC)通过分组定时和分组大小泄漏秘密。它们在公共IaaS云中尤其令人担忧,在公共IaaS云中,任何租户都可以托管并间接观察受害者的流量形状。我们介绍Pacer,这是第一个在公共IaaS云中端到端消除NSC泄漏的系统。它建立在塑造客人外部的客人流量的原则性技术基础上,通过设计使流量形状独立于秘密。然而,Pacer还解决了以前工作中没有考虑的重要问题-它防止内部侧信道泄漏影响整形流量,并且它尊重网络流量控制,拥塞控制和丢失恢复信号。Pacer是作为主机hypervisor的准虚拟化扩展实现的,只需要对hypervisor和来宾内核进行适度的更改,并且只需要对应用程序进行可选的最小更改。我们提出了Pacer的关键抽象的隐形隧道,描述其设计和实现,证明了重要的设计方面的安全性,通过正式的模型,并通过实验评估表明,Pacer对带宽,客户端延迟和服务器吞吐量施加适度的开销,同时挫败基于最先进的CNN分类器的攻击。

英文摘要:

Network side channels (NSCs) leak secrets through packet timing and packet sizes. They are of particular concern in public IaaS Clouds, where any tenant may be able to colocate and indirectly observe a victim's traffic shape. We present Pacer, the first system that eliminates NSC leaks in public IaaS Clouds end-to-end. It builds on the principled technique of shaping guest traffic outside the guest to make the traffic shape independent of secrets by design. However, Pacer also addresses important concerns that have not been considered in prior work -- it prevents internal side-channel leaks from affecting reshaped traffic, and it respects network flow control, congestion control and loss recovery signals. Pacer is implemented as a paravirtualizing extension to the host hypervisor, requiring modest changes to the hypervisor and the guest kernel, and only optional, minimal changes to applications. We present Pacer's key abstraction of a cloaked tunnel, describe its design and implementation, prove the security of important design aspects through a formal model, and show through an experimental evaluation that Pacer imposes moderate overheads on bandwidth, client latency, and server throughput, while thwarting attacks based on state-of-the-art CNN classifiers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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