数据包追踪：通过缓存侧通道监视网络数据包
Packet Chasing: Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel
摘要：
本文介绍了数据包追踪，网络上的攻击，不需要访问网络，并工作，无论特权级别的进程接收的数据包。间谍进程可以轻松地探测和发现网络驱动程序使用的每个缓冲区的确切缓存位置。更有用的是，它可以发现这些缓冲区用于接收数据包的确切顺序。这使得数据包频率和数据包大小能够通过缓存侧通道进行监控。这允许发送者和无法访问网络的远程间谍之间的隐蔽通道，以及可以识别网络上受害者的网页访问模式等的直接攻击。除了识别潜在的攻击，这项工作提出了一个基于软件的短期缓解，以及轻量级的，自适应的，缓存分区缓解，阻止干扰的I/O和CPU请求的最后一级缓存。
英文摘要：
This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover the exact cache location of each buffer used by the network driver. Even more useful, it can discover the exact sequence in which those buffers are used to receive packets. This then enables packet frequency and packet sizes to be monitored through cache side channels. This allows both covert channels between a sender and a remote spy with no access to the network, as well as direct attacks that can identify, among other things, the web page access patterns of a victim on the network. In addition to identifying the potential attack, this work proposes a software-based short-term mitigation as well as a light-weight, adaptive, cache partitioning mitigation that blocks the interference of I/O and CPU requests in the last-level cache.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
