一种基于TSX的边信道退出UMIP和描述符表的方法
A Way Around UMIP and Descriptor-Table Exiting via TSX-based Side-Channel
摘要:
目前,在操作系统中,有许多保护机制阻止或限制用户态应用程序访问内核内部信息。这通常由基于软件的防御措施来执行,例如地址空间布局随机化(ASLR)和内核ASLR(KASLR)。当考虑到沙盒应用程序(如Web浏览器)的安全性时,它们扮演着重要的角色。如果绕过这些保护,攻击者可以在内核内存中进行任意写入访问,那么攻击者可以找到合适的位置进行写入,以获得特权提升或在环0中执行代码。本文介绍了一种基于事务同步扩展(TSX)边道泄漏的全局描述符表(GDT)和同步描述符表(IDT)地址的可靠方法。我们指出,通过检测这些地址,可以执行指令,以回避英特尔用户模式指令预防(UMIP)和基于管理程序的缓解,因此,中和它们。在最近的Meltdown和Spectre补丁之后,成功执行了所介绍的方法。此外,所提出的方法在不同平台上的实现,包括最新版本的Microsoft Windows、Linux和具有最新第9代Intel处理器的Mac OSX,表明所提出的机制独立于操作系统实现。我们证明了这种方法与调用门机制(在现代处理器中可用)在事件链中的组合将最终导致系统妥协,尽管在Windows专有的基于虚拟化的安全(VBS)存在的超级安全沙箱环境的限制。最后,我们建议基于软件的缓解措施,以避免这些问题与可接受的开销成本。
英文摘要:
Nowadays, in operating systems, numerous protection mechanisms prevent or limit the user-mode applicationsto access the kernels internal information. This is regularlycarried out by software-based defenses such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Kernel ASLR(KASLR). They play pronounced roles when the security of sandboxed applications such as Web-browser are considered.Armed with arbitrary write access in the kernel memory, if these protections are bypassed, an adversary could find a suitable where to write in order to get an elevation of privilege or code execution in ring 0. In this paper, we introduce a reliable method based on Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) side-channel leakage to reveal the address of the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). We indicate that by detecting these addresses, one could execute instructions to sidestep the Intels User-Mode InstructionPrevention (UMIP) and the Hypervisor-based mitigation and, consequently, neutralized them. The introduced method is successfully performed after the most recent patches for Meltdown and Spectre. Moreover, the implementation of the proposed approach on different platforms, including the latest releases of Microsoft Windows, Linux, and, Mac OSX with the latest 9th generation of Intel processors, shows that the proposed mechanism is independent from the Operating System implementation. We demonstrate that a combinationof this method with call-gate mechanism (available in modernprocessors) in a chain of events will eventually lead toa system compromise despite the limitations of a super-secure sandboxed environment in the presence of Windows proprietary Virtualization Based Security (VBS). Finally, we suggest the software-based mitigation to avoid these issues with an acceptable overhead cost.
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