RandOhm：使用随机化电路配置来缓解阻抗侧信道攻击
RandOhm: Mitigating Impedance Side-channel Attacks using Randomized Circuit Configurations
AI总结：
本文提出 RandOhm，一种基于 FPGA 和 SoC 部分重配置的移动目标防御策略，通过运行时随机化电路布局布线使数据计算与阻抗去相关，有效防御阻抗侧信道攻击，并在 28-nm FPGA 上验证了其对 AES 密码的保护效果及开销。
摘要：
物理侧信道攻击可能会损害集成电路的安全性。大多数物理侧信道攻击（例如，功耗或电磁）利用芯片的动态行为，通常表现为电流消耗的变化或电压波动，其中算法对策（例如，掩码）可以有效地缓解它们。然而，正如最近所证明的那样，这些缓解技术对于诸如阻抗分析之类的反向散射侧信道攻击并非完全有效。在阻抗攻击的情况下，攻击者利用芯片电源分配网络（PDN）的数据相关阻抗变化来提取秘密信息。在这项工作中，我们引入了 RandOhm，它利用基于主流 FPGA 和可编程 SoC 的部分重配置（PR）功能的移动目标防御（MTD）策略，来防御阻抗侧信道攻击。我们证明，通过对电路中秘密敏感部分进行运行时重配置，可以显著减少通过 PDN 阻抗泄漏的信息。因此，通过不断随机化电路的布局和布线，可以使数据相关的计算与阻抗值去相关。此外，与现有的基于 PR 的对策相比，RandOhm 在可编程 SoC 上部署了开源比特流操作工具，以加快随机化速度并提供实时保护。为了验证我们的主张，我们将 RandOhm 应用于在 28-nm FPGA 上实现的 AES 密码。我们通过执行非剖析和剖析阻抗分析攻击来分析我们方法的弹性，并从延迟和性能方面调查我们缓解措施的开销。
英文摘要：
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current consumption or voltage fluctuations where algorithmic countermeasures, such as masking, can effectively mitigate them. However, as demonstrated recently, these mitigation techniques are not entirely effective against backscattered side-channel attacks such as impedance analysis. In the case of an impedance attack, an adversary exploits the data-dependent impedance variations of the chip power delivery network (PDN) to extract secret information. In this work, we introduce RandOhm, which exploits a moving target defense (MTD) strategy based on the partial reconfiguration (PR) feature of mainstream FPGAs and programmable SoCs to defend against impedance side-channel attacks. We demonstrate that the information leakage through the PDN impedance could be significantly reduced via runtime reconfiguration of the secret-sensitive parts of the circuitry. Hence, by constantly randomizing the placement and routing of the circuit, one can decorrelate the data-dependent computation from the impedance value. Moreover, in contrast to existing PR-based countermeasures, RandOhm deploys open-source bitstream manipulation tools on programmable SoCs to speed up the randomization and provide real-time protection. To validate our claims, we apply RandOhm to AES ciphers realized on 28-nm FPGAs. We analyze the resiliency of our approach by performing non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks and investigate the overhead of our mitigation in terms of delay and performance.
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