嵌入式系统中挫败代码重用与侧信道攻击
Thwarting Code-Reuse and Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Systems
AI总结:
本文提出SecDivCon组合编译器方法,将代码多样化与侧信道缓解相结合,在可控开销下同时抵御嵌入式设备中的代码重用攻击和侧信道攻击。
摘要:
嵌入式设备日益普遍地出现在我们的日常生活中。它们经常处理关键信息,因此依赖密码协议来实现安全性。然而,嵌入式设备仍然容易受到攻击者的侵害,这些攻击者试图劫持其运行并通过利用侧信道和代码重用来提取敏感信息。代码重用攻击(CRAs)可以将程序的执行导向恶意结果,在无法直接访问设备内存的情况下改变现有的板载代码。此外,侧信道攻击(SCAs)可能仅凭对设备的观察就向攻击者泄露秘密信息。针对嵌入式设备挫败代码重用攻击和侧信道攻击具有挑战性,因为嵌入式设备通常资源受限。细粒度代码多样化通过给二进制代码引入不确定性来阻碍代码重用攻击;而软件机制可以挫败时序或功耗侧信道攻击。对任一攻击的抵御能力可能以整体效率为代价。此外,目前尚不存在一种能够同时保持针对代码重用攻击和侧信道攻击的缓解措施的统一方法。在本文中,我们提出了一种新颖的“按构造实现安全多样化”(SecDivCon)方法来应对这一挑战。SecDivCon是一种基于组合编译器的途径,它将针对代码重用攻击的软件多样化与针对侧信道攻击的软件缓解措施相结合。SecDivCon限制了由所生成的用于挫败攻击的代码引入的性能开销,因此提供了一种按设计保证安全的方法,使得能够对性能与安全之间的权衡进行控制。我们使用16个基准程序进行的实验表明,具有侧信道感知能力的多样化能够有效抵御代码重用攻击,同时在较低且可控的开销下保持侧信道攻击缓解特性。鉴于我们方法的组合性质,SecDivCon适用于对侧信道攻击敏感的小型、性能关键型函数。
英文摘要:
Embedded devices are increasingly present in our everyday life. They often process critical information, and hence, rely on cryptographic protocols to achieve security. However, embedded devices remain vulnerable to attackers seeking to hijack their operation and extract sensitive information by exploiting side channels and code reuse. Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs) can steer the execution of a program to malicious outcomes, altering existing on-board code without direct access to the device memory. Moreover, Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) may reveal secret information to the attacker based on mere observation of the device. Thwarting CRAs and SCAs against embedded devices is challenging because embedded devices are often resource constrained. Fine-grained code diversification hinders CRAs by introducing uncertainty to the binary code; while software mechanisms can thwart timing or power SCAs. The resilience to either attack may come at the price of the overall efficiency. Moreover, a unified approach that preserves these mitigations against both CRAs and SCAs is not available. In this paper, we propose a novel Secure Diversity by Construction (SecDivCon) approach that tackles this challenge. SecDivCon is a combinatorial compiler-based approach that combines software diversification against CRAs with software mitigations against SCAs. SecDivCon restricts the performance overhead introduced by the generated code that thwarts the attacks and hence, offers a secure-by-design approach enabling control over the performance-security trade-off. Our experiments, using 16 benchmark programs, show that SCA-aware diversification is effective against CRAs, while preserving SCA mitigation properties at a low, controllable overhead. Given the combinatorial nature of our approach, SecDivCon is suitable for small, performance-critical functions that are sensitive to SCAs.
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