一种用于检测和减轻基于缓存的侧信道攻击的路由器辅助路由器
A Compiler Assisted Scheduler for Detecting and Mitigating Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks
摘要：
侧信道攻击通过巧妙地利用信息泄漏来窃取密钥，因此可以破解加密。因此，侧信道攻击的检测和缓解是非常重要的问题，但是文献中提出的解决方案具有局限性，因为它们在服务器上的真实世界多租户设置中不起作用，具有高误报，或者具有高开销。在这项工作中，我们展示了一个编译器引导的调度程序，BISTOWN，检测基于缓存的侧信道攻击的进程调度多租户服务器农场。该解决方案的一个关键元素涉及使用缓存未命中模型，该模型由编译器插入到循环嵌套的入口处，以预测相应循环的缓存未命中。这种插入的库调用或信标在运行时间将高速缓存未命中信息传送给调度器，调度器使用它来共同调度进程，使得它们的组合高速缓存占用空间不超过最后一级高速缓存的最大容量。然后监视调度的进程的实际与预测的缓存未命中，并且当检测到异常时，调度器执行搜索以隔离攻击者。我们表明，Biscrete能够检测和减轻Prime+Probe，Flush+ Flush和Flush+Flush攻击OpenSSL加密算法的F分数为1，也可以检测和减轻视觉应用程序套件的服务降级的F分数为0.9375。在无攻击的情况下，该方案的开销很低（最高可达6%）。在攻击的情况下，该方案最终的开销不到11%，并且在某些情况下能够将服务质量降低40%。凭借这些许多理想的功能，例如处理多租户的能力，早期检测攻击的能力，减轻这些攻击的能力，以及低运行时开销，BISTORM是一个实用的解决方案。
英文摘要：
Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the literature have limitations in that they do not work in a real-world multi-tenancy setting on servers, have high false positives, or have high overheads. In this work, we demonstrate a compiler guided scheduler, Biscuit, that detects cache-based side channel attacks for processes scheduled on multi-tenancy server farms. A key element of this solution involves the use of a cache-miss model which is inserted by the compiler at the entrances of loop nests to predict the cache misses of the corresponding loop. Such inserted library calls, or beacons, convey the cache miss information to the scheduler at run time, which uses it to co-schedule processes such that their combined cache footprint does not exceed the maximum capacity of the last level cache. The scheduled processes are then monitored for actual vs predicted cache misses, and when an anomaly is detected, the scheduler performs a search to isolate the attacker. We show that Biscuit is able to detect and mitigate Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, and Flush+Flush attacks on OpenSSL cryptography algorithms with an F-score of 1, and also to detect and mitigate degradation of service on a vision application suite with an F-score of 0.9375. Under a no-attack scenario, the scheme poses low overheads (up to a maximum of 6 percent). In the case of an attack, the scheme ends up with less than 11 percent overhead and is able to reduce the degradation of service in some cases by 40 percent. With these many desirable features such as an ability to deal with multi-tenancy, its ability to detect attacks early, its ability to mitigate those attacks, and low runtime overheads, Biscuit is a practical solution.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
