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arXiv 1806.10360cs.CR
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5G认证的形式化分析

A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication

David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi, Saša Radomirović, Ralf Sasse, Vincent Stettler

摘要:

移动通信网络连接着世界上大部分人口。用户通话、SMS和移动数据的安全性取决于所使用的认证密钥交换协议提供的保证。对于下一代网络(5G),3GPP组已经为此目的标准化了5G AKA协议。我们提供了AKA系列协议的第一个全面的正式模型:5G AKA。我们还从定义5G的3GPP标准中提取了精确的要求,并确定了缺失的安全目标。使用安全协议验证工具Tamarin,我们针对5G安全目标对模型进行了全面、系统的安全评估。我们的自动分析确定了每个安全目标所需的最低安全假设,我们发现,除了标准中缺少的其他假设之外,一些关键的安全目标没有得到满足。最后,我们针对我们发现的攻击和弱点提出了明确的建议,并提供了可证明安全的修复方案。

英文摘要:

Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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