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arXiv 2209.03599cs.CR
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EDHOC协议的安全性分析

Security Analysis of the EDHOC protocol

Baptiste Cottier, David Pointcheval

摘要:

Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE(EDHOC)旨在成为一种非常紧凑和轻量级的具有临时密钥的认证Diffie-Hellman密钥交换。预计它将提供相互认证、前向保密和身份保护,具有128位安全级别。在SECRYPT '21上已经提出了对以前版本的正式分析,并在IETF正在进行的评估过程中进行了一些改进。不幸的是,虽然形式化分析可以发现协议中的一些误解,但它不能评估实际的安全级别。在没有完全中断的情况下,我们无论如何都会在2^64个操作中展示攻击,这与预期的128位安全级别相矛盾。此后,我们提出了改进,其中一些是在没有额外的成本,以实现128位的安全性的所有安全属性(即密钥隐私,相互认证和身份保护)。

英文摘要:

Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) aims at being a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. It is expected to provide mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection, with a 128-bit security level.A formal analysis has already been proposed at SECRYPT '21, on a former version, leading to some improvements, in the ongoing evaluation process by IETF. Unfortunately, while formal analysis can detect some misconceptions in the protocol, it cannot evaluate the actual security level.In this paper, we study the last version. Without complete breaks, we anyway exhibit attacks in 2^64 operations, which contradict the expected 128-bit security level. We thereafter propose improvements, some of them being at no additional cost, to achieve 128-bit security for all the security properties (i.e. key privacy, mutual authentication, and identity-protection).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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