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arXiv 1809.06925cs.CR
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5G规范的安全性和协议漏洞分析

Security and Protocol Exploit Analysis of the 5G Specifications

Roger Piqueras Jover, Vuk Marojevic

摘要:

第三代合作伙伴计划(3GPP)于2018年3月发布了首个5G安全规范。本文回顾了5G安全架构、要求和主要流程,并在已知和新协议利用的背景下对其进行了评估。虽然与前几代相比,安全性得到了增强,以解决已知的协议漏洞,但我们的分析确定了一些对安全性至关重要的潜在不切实际的系统假设,以及一些可能使5G系统容易受到对抗攻击的协议边缘情况。例如,支持空加密和空身份验证,并且可以在有效的系统配置中使用,并且某些关键安全功能仍然不在规范的范围内。此外,防止预认证消息漏洞似乎依赖于不切实际的运营商和漫游协议以及所有全球运营商的公钥管理的隐含假设。并行地,只有在服务网络实施可选的安全特征并且UE知道归属网络运营商的公钥的情况下,才防止诸如国际移动订户身份(IMSI)捕获器的现有威胁。与4G LTE协议漏洞的比较表明,截至Release 15的5G安全规范并没有完全解决用户隐私和网络可用性问题,其中一个边缘情况可能会危及5G用户和服务的隐私,安全性和可用性。

英文摘要:

The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) released its first 5G security specifications in March 2018. This paper reviews the 5G security architecture, requirements and main processes and evaluates them in the context of known and new protocol exploits. Although the security has been enhanced when compared to previous generations to tackle known protocol exploits, our analysis identifies some potentially unrealistic system assumptions that are critical for security as well as a number protocol edge cases that could render 5G systems vulnerable to adversarial attacks. For example, null encryption and null authentication are supported and can be used in valid system configurations, and certain key security functions are still left outside of the scope of the specifications. Moreover, the prevention of pre-authentcation message exploits appears to rely on the implicit assumption of impractical carrier and roaming agreements and the management of public keys from all global operators. In parallel, existing threats such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers are prevented only if the serving network enforces optional security features and if the UE knows the public key of the home network operator. The comparison with 4G LTE protocol exploits reveals that the 5G security specifications, as of Release 15, do not fully address the user privacy and network availability concerns, where one edge case can compromise the privacy, security and availability of 5G users and services.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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